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Performance Pay, The Marriage Market and Rising Income Inequality in 
Taiwan 
 
Abstract 
Taiwan expanded its college access significantly over the past two decades by 
converting 2-year junior colleges to 4-year colleges and relaxing entrance standards.  
The share of college graduates in the 22-24 years old population rose from 12% to 
71% between 1990 and 2014.  This should have suppressed returns to schooling and 
lowered inequality, but Taiwan’s Gini coefficient rose steadily over that period.  We 
show that rising use of performance pay and positive assortative mating in the 
marriage market combine to explain the rising inequality.  The presence of 
performance pay and positive assortative mating jointly increase the household 
income inequality by 70% between 1980 and 2014.  Our results suggest that the 
uneven quality of the most recent cohorts of college graduates led to two sources of 
rising household income inequality: the increased use of bonus pay which increases 
residual inequality among college graduates; and matching on unobserved skills in the 
marriage market which increases inequality among married couples.  
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In Taiwan, the household Gini coefficient climbed from 0.25 to 0.34 between 
1980 and 2014 as shown in Figure 1.  While rising inequality is common across most 
developed economies (OECD, 2012), the Taiwan case has some unique features.  
First, while household inequality is rising, several studies have found that wage 
inequality for individual workers is declining or stable (Cheng, 2004; Chen and Hsu, 
2001; Chan et al., 1999).  These studies were based on wages without including the 
annual bonus.2  As shown in Figure 1, Gini coefficients based solely on individual 
wages without incorporating the bonus fell from 0.30 to 0.26 between 1980 and 2014.  
Second, slow growth of the college-educated labor relative to the pace of technical 
change is viewed as a major cause of rising inequality in other developed economies 
(OECD, 2015; Goldin and Katz, 2009).  That was not the case in Taiwan where a 
government policy that converted junior colleges to 4-year colleges and a relaxation 
of college entrance requirements increased college enrollments dramatically.3  As a 
result, the college share of the workforce rose from 5% to 34% since 1980.  The 
college share among the youngest workers was 74% by 2014!  Such a rapid increase 
in the supply of college graduates should have outpaced technology growth and 
moderated income inequality.   
Using data from the Taiwan Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (SFIE), 
                                                       
2 These studies used the Taiwan Manpower Survey which does not include information on bonus. 
3  The pass rate on the college entrance exam rose from 29% in 1980 to 96% in 2014. 
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we demonstrate how Taiwan household income inequality rose despite declining wage 
inequality and dramatically rising college share of the labor force.  We find three 
main reasons for the rising household income inequality.  The first is that employers 
increasingly relied on bonus over the period with the share of wage earners receiving 
bonus pay increasing from 48% in 1980 to 71% in and 2014. Second, the expansion 
of access to college education increased women’s educational attainment and led to 
higher women’s labor force participation rate from 39% in 1980 to 50% in 2014.  
The greatest increases in female labor force participation were among the most 
educated.  Third, positive assortative mating and rising female labor force 
participation led to additional upward pressure on household income inequality.  
These forces outweighed the equalizing effects of rapidly rising college graduation 
which lowered the college wage premium for the youngest cohorts. 
The increasing use of performance pay and positive assortative mating in the 
marriage market combine to explain 70% of the increase in household income 
inequality from 1980 to 2014, with increased use of bonuses accounting for 52% and 
the marriage market accounting for 48%.  Absent these two factors, household 
income inequality would be 42% lower for the time period of 2004-2014.  While it 
seems that expanding access to college should be a means of reducing income 
inequality in the presence of skill-biased technical change, Taiwan presents an 
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example that income inequality can rise, even in a country experiencing one of the 
fastest expanding college labor forces among developed countries. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we 
present a review of the relevant literature.  In section II, we use a simple empirical 
model to estimate the contribution of performance pay and marriage market on the 
income inequality, followed by Section III that examines the effect of assortative 
mating and married female labor force participation on inequality.  Section IV 
employs a decomposition approach to explore the contribution of household 
composition to the rising income inequality.  We conclude the paper in section V. 
I. Literature Review 
Economic growth in the world’s advanced economies has been accompanied by 
widening income gaps between the rich and poor.  Of the 22 countries for which 
long-term data are available, inequality rose in 17 between the mid-1980s and 2013 
(OECD, 2015).  Many studies have pointed to skill-biased technical change that 
outpaced the growth of college trained labor as a common factor contributing to the 
rising inequality in the developed world (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Card and Lemieux, 
2001; Goldin and Katz, 2008; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008). 
In addition to the shifts in the demand and supply for skilled workers, positive 
assortative mating and rising married female labor force participation have also 
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contributed to rising income inequality.  Schwartz (2010) and Greenwood et al. 
(2014) concluded that positive assortative matching between husbands and wives was 
responsible for a 25%-30% increase in the Gini coefficient in the United States.  
This significant increase in inequality due to nonrandom matching is a result of rising 
married female labor force participation at a time of rising homogamy in spousal 
education mating (Siow, 2013).4  The rising household inequality due to the marriage 
market is in contrast to mixed conclusions from earlier periods.  Karoly and Burtless 
(1995) and Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) argued that sorting would increase 
inequality, while Kremer (1997) concluded that there was no effect on inequality and 
Cancian and Reed (1999), Pencavel (2006) and Daly, et al. (2006) found that 
women’s labor participation equalized income.  Smith (1979) found that wife’s 
earnings equalized household income for white families while increasing inequality 
among Black families.  Evidence from other developed countries generally finds 
negligible effects of wives’ earnings on household income inequality (OECD, 2011). 
While most of the earlier studies have focused on rising income inequality in 
Europe and North America, Milanovic and Yitzhaki’s (2002) review of world income 
inequality suggested that the greatest share of world inequality is found in Asia.  
Fields and Yoo (2000) showed that wage inequality fell in Korea due to rapidly rising 
                                                       
4  Gihleb and Lang (2016) contend that the finding of rising incidence of positive assortative mating 
disappears when finer education categories are used.  
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access to schooling and a concave return to experience that lowers the income 
advantage for the most experienced workers.  Rising female labor force participation 
rates also lowered inequality through the marriage market where two earner 
households helped to equalize household earnings.  On the other hand, inequality 
rose in China (Chotikapanich et al, 2007; Wan, Lu and Chen, 2007).  There, 
inequality was attributed to rising income disparities between urban and rural labor 
markets and to differences in Foreign Direct Investment which created an unequal 
pace of labor demand growth across regions.  Taiwan data showed that the increased 
correlation between spouses’ income through assortative mating is the main source of 
the rising Gini coefficient between 1978 and the mid 1990s (Fields and Leary, 1999; 
Fournier, 2001; Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand, 2001). 
A growing literature examines the effect of performance pay on income 
inequality.  Performance pay has become an increasing component of worker 
compensation (Lazear, 2000; Lemieux et al., 2009; Heywood and Parent, 2009; 
Pannenberg and Spiess, 2009; Bell and Van Reenen, 2013).  If technical change is 
raising output particularly for the most educated or experienced workers relative to 
less skilled workers, , performance-based pay may increase income inequality.  
Lemieux et al. (2009) showed that performance pay increased income inequality 
among male workers by 21% between the late 1970s and the mid 1990s.  Heywood 
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and Parent (2009) found that performance pay led to rising pay gaps between Black 
and white males at the upper tail of the wage distribution.  Bell and Van Reenen 
(2013) showed corroborating evidence in the United Kingdom where performance 
pay increased inequality between 1979 and 2007.  However, Sommerfeld (2013) 
found no effect of performance pay on income inequality in Germany. 
II. The Effect of Performance Pay and Marriage on Income Inequality 
Over the period of 1980 through 2014, the bonus share of total compensation in 
Taiwan increased from 8% to 19%.  Performance pay is most common among 
college-educated workers as opposed to high school workers: 92% vs. 70% received 
bonuses in 2014.  Bonuses represent 22% of the compensation for college graduates 
and 18% of the compensation for high school graduates in 2014.  Because of its 
rising importance in magnitude and frequency as well as its atypical importance to the 
most educated groups, bonus pay could play a key role in raising household 
inequality. 
We start by comparing the time paths of three alternate Gini coefficients based 
on individual annual wage income without the bonus, individual annual wage income 
with the bonus, and annual household wage income including bonuses.  The 
resulting series illustrate the impacts of the bonus and the marriage market on income 
inequality.  The Gini coefficients are calculated using the method proposed by 
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Milanovic (1997):  
G ൌ ቀ ଵ√ଷቁ ∙ ቀ
ఙ೤
௬ത ቁ ∙ ሺߩ൫ݕ, ݎ௬൯ሻ          (1) 
where ሺఙ೤௬ത ሻ is the coefficient of variation in household income; ߪ௬ and ݕത are the 
standard deviation and mean of household income, respectively; and ߩ൫ݕ, ݎ௬൯, is the 
correlation between household income (y) and the rank of the household based on 
their income (ݎ௬ሻ.  We use the Milanovic method rather than Lorenz’s (1905) 
polygon Gini because of its ease of computation with individual data.  Milanovic’s 
Gini coefficient has been widely used in practice and studies also show that it 
generates values that are close to Lorenz’s polygon Gini.5 
Figure 1 displays the three series of Gini coefficients for the 1980-2014 time 
period.  The Gini coefficients based on individual annual wage income excluding the 
bonus (base wage) lies everywhere below the other two measures, demonstrating that 
there is greater equality in the base wage.  Moreover, the time path suggests that 
income inequality has declined from 0.3 to 0.27 between 1980 and 2014 as the share 
of college graduates I he labor market surges.     
When performance pay is added to individual base wage compensation, the Gini 
coefficient rises in all years.  The gap between the series with and without the bonus 
widened after late 1990s, the period when the college graduate share of the labor force 
                                                       
5 See Deltas (2003), Abounoori and Mccloughan (2003), Meng (2004), Mussard et al. (2011) and 
Sadefo Kamdem (2012). 
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began to rise rapidly.  Comparing the two Gini coefficient series including and 
excluding the bonus, we conclude that ignoring performance pay understates income 
inequality by 11% in 2014.6   
Gini coefficients using household income were smaller than the ones using 
individual income throughout the 1980s, meaning that the marriage market made the 
income distribution more equal.  After 1992, the series based on household wage 
income with bonus rose steadily, even as the progressively larger cohorts of college 
graduates entered the labor market.  The gap between the two series including bonus 
pay rose to 13% by 2014, illustrating that the marriage market increased inequality 
substantially.  More importantly, even as inequality fell based on individual wage 
income after 2008, the household-income Gini coefficients remained stable.  The 
marriage market reversed any equalizing effect of the labor market after the recession. 
Taken together, the household income inequality in 2014 would have been 22% 
lower had the effects of both performance pay (9%) and the marriage market (13%) 
not been considered.  In other words, any equalizing effect of the expansion of 
higher education on income inequality is more than offset by the increased reliance on 
performance pay and sorting through the marriage market. 
III. The Effect of Positive Assortative Mating and Married Female Labor Force 
Participation on Income Inequality 
                                                       
6  Using U.S. data, Lemieux (2009) also found that performance pay widens income inequality with its 
effect growing stronger as performance pay became more prevalent. 
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We have seen a significant increase in income inequality when moving from 
individual income to household income.  This section demonstrates that the 
increased inequality is driven by the rising importance of positive assortative mating.  
We first show that there has been a significance increase in positive assortative mating 
in the marriage market.  We divide household income into 10 deciles and group 
households by marital status (married and single), education level (less than high 
school, high school, junior college, and college plus), employment status (work and 
unemployed), and the number of children (0, 1, 2, and greater than 2).  More 
aggregate classifications can be obtained by combining finer classifications. 
In Table 1, we illustrate the changing incidence of positive assortative mating by 
education level for 1980 and 2014.  For each education combination, we report the 
actual share of matching in all married households and the share that would have 
occurred if marital matching were random.  The diagonal percentages are the 
matches in which both husband and wife have identical education levels.  In 1980, 
the overwhelming share of the adult population had not completed high school and 
71.6% of marriages involved matches within education groups.  However, if 
marriage matches were due to purely random sorting, only 54.9% of marriages would 
have been within education groups, meaning that the disproportionate share of 
within-schooling group marriages due to positive assortative mating is 16.7%.  By 
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2014, there was substantially more heterogeneity in completed schooling, and so 
purely random sorting would have resulted in only 18% of marriages within education 
groups.  The actual incidence of within-schooling group matches was 61.9%, 
meaning that positive assortative mating by education level accounts for 43.8% of 
marriages.  Meanwhile, two college graduate marriages rose from 2.1% to 14.7% of 
all marriages.7   
As shown in Figure 2, the ratio of the sum of the diagonal percentages of actual 
matches to that of random matches is always greater than 1 which indicates positive 
assortative mating.  The ratio has risen steadily since 1980, implying that the 
incidence of positive assortative mating has almost doubled over 30 years. 
 Following the methods proposed by Greenwood, et. al (2014), we construct 
counterfactual Gini coefficients assuming random matching to assess the extent to 
which positive assortative mating affects household income inequality.  Figure 3 
shows that moving from the observed matching pattern to random matching had a 
relatively small effect on the Gini coefficients in the 1980s.   By 1990, the observed 
Gini coefficient was 0.29 compared to 0.28 with random marital matching.  By 2014, 
the observed Gini coefficient is 0.34 compared to only 0.29 with random marital 
                                                       
7 We used Gihleb and Lang’s (GL) (2016) educational classification, which separates graduate degrees 
from Bachelor’s degrees, and use rank-order correlation to examine the evolution of positive 
assortative mating.  The results are consistent with those of our current classification.  Kendall’s τ_b 
correlation coefficient based on GL classification was 0.59 in 1978 and 0.74 in 2014. 
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matching.  The Gini coefficient would have only increased from 0.28 to 0.29 since 
1990 if the matching process were random, meaning that positive assortative mating 
explains almost all the difference between household- and individual-income Gini 
coefficients.  The household Gini coefficient rises by 17% because of positive 
assortative mating.8   
 Another factor reinforcing the effect of positive assortative mating is married 
female labor force participation (MFLP).  MFLP can increase or decrease income 
inequality depending on whether the more or less educated married women are likely 
to work.  We construct the counterfactual Gini for 2000 and 2014 holding marital 
mating as random and the MFLP rates at their 1980 levels.  The counterfactual Gini 
coefficient is only slightly smaller than the observed Gini in 2000, but it falls from 
0.29 to 0.27 by 2014.  That means that rising MFLP for the most educated women is 
also increasing household income inequality in Taiwan.  
The role of MFLP is illustrated in Figure 4 which shows how MFLP changed by 
household income deciles between 1980 and 2014.  Compared to 1980, the MFLP 
rate was 20 percentage points higher in the upper half of the household income 
distribution.  At the same time, the MFLP fell dramatically in the bottom 40% of the 
                                                       
8 The conclusion also holds when we adjusted the household income to a per adult basis by the OECD 
equivalent scale. 
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distribution.  The households at the upper tail of the distribution atypically have two 
earners and the households at the bottom of the distribution atypically have one 
earner.9 
IV. Variance Decomposition Approach 
While the Gini coefficient and marriage market analysis provides an overall 
summary measure of the evolution of household income inequality in Taiwan, we are 
also interested in monitoring how more finely defined changing shares of household 
composition contribute to rising income inequality.  To do this, we decompose the 
changing variance of household income into three components: changing group 
population share, changing within-group income variance, and changing 
between-group income variance.  We focus on three time periods: (1) 1980-1989: 
before the rapid expansion of college access; (2) 1992-2001: during the increase in 
college enrollments and the initial surge in college share of the labor market; and (3) 
2005-2014: after the policy changes in college access and the fastest increase in 
college share of the labor force. 
The decomposition for the total variance in income ߪ௒ଶ is given as: 
ߪ௒ଶ ൌ ∑ ߙ௜ߪ௒೔ଶ௞௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߙ௜ሺ തܻ௜ െ ധܻሻଶ௞௜ୀଵ         (4) 
where ߪ௒೔ଶ  is the within group i variance of household income; ߙ௜ is the group i 
population share of all households; തܻ௜. is the mean household income for group i; and 
                                                       
9 This trend has an age component.  65% of the households in the bottom 20% of the income bracket 
are headed by a spouse older than 65 in 2014, compared to only 5% in 1980. 
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ധܻ is the overall mean household income.  The first term shows how much of the 
variance is due to inequality within groups while the second term denotes how much 
of the income variance is due to inequality between groups.  Table 2 reports the 
average values for the decomposition in the three periods.  Over thirty years, the 
overall household income variance increased 3 times.  The within-group and 
between group components are almost equally responsible for the increase in 
household income variance.  However, because the between-group variance was 
relatively unimportant in 1980, it makes the greatest jump in its share of the total 
variance which increases from 26% to 43%.   
To illustrate the role of performance pay, we construct household income 
variance with the base pay only and then with the base pay plus bonus.  Similarly, to 
demonstrate the role of the marriage market on the income variance, we construct the 
counterfactual income variance by altering the population share ߙ௜ to be the share 
that would have occurred with random marital sorting rather than the observed shares.  
The results reported in Table 3 corroborate our previous findings: there is growing 
influence of performance pay and assortative mating on household income inequality.  
The household income variance is 17.4% higher because of performance pay in 1980, 
but it is 41.1% higher in 2005-2014.  Positive assortative mating accounted for an 
additional 13.7% higher variance in 1980-1989, and 20.5% higher household income 
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variance in 2005-2014.  The household income variance is 42% ((5665-3330)/5665) 
higher in 2005-2014 because of the marriage market and performance-based pay. 
The relative contribution of performance pay and positive assortative mating on 
the evolution of income inequality can be estimated accordingly.  We start from the 
actual household income variance in 1980-1990 and then construct two counterfactual 
series of income inequality: (1) random mating and bonus, and (2) random mating and 
no bonus.  From Table 3, the actual household income variance has grown by 3.03 
times from 1,405 to 5,665 between 1980 and 2014.  On the other hand, the first 
counterfactual series suggests that the household income variance would have 
increased to 4,458 in 2014 when mating in the marriage market is held random.  The 
second counterfactual series further removes performance pay and the result shows 
that the household income variance would have grown only to 3,330 by 2014. 
Similar to most decomposition analyses, the marginal contribution of the 
performance pay and positive assortative mating will be different if we construct the 
counterfactuals by excluding bonus first before holding marriage mating random.  
By taking the average of both sequences, 70% of the growth in the household income 
inequality between 1980 and 2014 can be attributed to the presence of performance 
pay and positive assortative mating, of which performance pay and positive 
assortative mating account for 48% and 52% of the increase, respectively. 
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For further insights, we demonstrate which education-marriage groups 
contributed most to the rising household income inequality.  Table 4 shows the 
contribution of each component to the overall variance in percentages for each more 
aggregated demographic group.  The effect of college expansion is apparent as the 
contribution of changing shares to the overall change in income variance mainly come 
from college-educated households.  The contribution of changing shares among 
married households is largely driven by two-earner households, particularly the two 
college-earner households (9.7% out of 15.8% in the summary).  This demographic 
shift is also reflected by the significant decline in the shares of single high school 
earner married households (contribution to the overall change is -3.4%).  More 
importantly, single households only account for 22% of the changes in the overall 
variance over the past 30 years despite their rising share of households.  Married 
households play the most prominent role in rising household income inequality.  Of 
those, two college-earner households contribute 30% to the change in the overall 
variance despite representing only 6% of all households.   
 Married households have greater within-group variance than the single ones.  
Changes in the within group variance among married households is responsible for 
42% of the total change in the overall variance.  Furthermore, married households 
also contribute more to the overall change in variance through between-group 
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variance than do single households.  Households with at least one college-educated 
earner, particularly the two college earner households, have the largest contribution.  
The marriage market consistently shows a significant amplifying effect on income 
inequality.  
The final two rows in the summary show that the contribution of households 
with at least one high school earner is mainly through increasing inequality within the 
group of high school educated married couples.  On the other hand, the contribution 
of college earner households to rising inequality comes from all three channels: their 
rising share of households, their rising average incomes, and rising inequality among 
the college educated couples.  Of the 3-fold increase in household income variance 
between 1980 and 2014, changing shares in the household composition is responsible 
for 20% of the growth and the remaining 80% can be attributed to rising inequality 
across wage earners within and across groups. 
V. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study shows that the marriage market combined with changing patterns of 
female labor force participation and the use of performance -based pay increase 
household income inequality in Taiwan, despite a dramatic increase in the share of 
college graduates in the labor force.  The large increase in college enrollments in 
Taiwan led to greater variance in the quality of college-educated workers with the 
19 
 
creation of weaker 4 year colleges and the admission of less prepared college entrants.  
As uncertainty regarding the quality of college graduates increased, employers had an 
incentive to increase the use of performance-based pay and decrease the weight on 
base pay (Keng et al., 2017; Carneiro and Lee, 2011).  The Taiwan case shows that 
increasing access to college by itself will not insure that income inequality will be 
held in check by increasing access to college unless the quality of college graduates 
can be maintained.   
The composition of final demand for goods has also changed in favor of the 
more educated workers.  Growing economic ties with China over the past 15 years 
led many firms to relocate their manufacturing base to China while design, marketing, 
finance and other management positions remain in Taiwan.  The job loss is 
disproportionally in the low-skill, labor intensive positions that were in the lower tail 
of income distribution.  That loss of low-skill manufacturing work contributed to the 
substantial decrease in the married female labor force at the lower tail of the 
household income distribution. 
Performance-based pay and the marriage market both allow sorting on 
unobservable productivity.  Unobservable productivity raises unequal observed 
earnings from unobserved match quality.  In Taiwan, as observed educational 
heterogeneity decreased with massive gains in college entry and the rapidly rising 
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share of college graduates in the labor force, inequality rose as marriage and 
employment contracts were increasingly predicated on the unobservables.  The 
Taiwan case offers a useful cautionary case for simplistic solutions to income 
inequality based solely on increasing college access. 
In sum, performance pay and household structure are each responsible for about 
half the growth in income inequality in Taiwan over the past 30 years.  The Taiwan 
case shows that expanding access to college alone will not reverse the trend toward 
inequality related to skill-biased technical change.
21 
 
References 
 
Abounoori, Esmaiel, and Patrick McCloughan. 2003. “A simple way to calculate the 
Gini Coefficient for grouped as well as ungrouped data.” Applied Economics Letters 
10(8): 505-509. 
  
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2008. “Trends in US 
wage inequality: Revising the revisionists.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
90(2): 300-323. 
 
Bell, Brian D., and John Van Reenen. 2013. “Extreme Wage Inequality: Pay at the 
Very Top.” American Economic Review, 103(3):  153-157. 
 
Bourguignon, François, Martin Fournier, and Marc Gurgand. 2001. “Fast 
development with a stable income distribution: Taiwan, 1979–94.” Review of Income 
and Wealth, 47(2): 139-163. 
 
Cancian, M., and D. Reed, D.1999. “The impact of wives’ earnings on income 
inequality: Issues and estimates.” Demography, 36(2):  173-184. 
 
Carneiro, P., and Lee, S. 2011. “Trends in Quality-Adjusted Skill Premia in the United 
States, 1960–2000.” The American Economic Review. 101(6): 2309-2349. 
 
Card, David, and Thiomas Lemieux, 2001. “Can falling supply explain the rising 
return to college for younger men? A cohort-based analysis.” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 116(2): 705-746. 
 
Chan, V. L., L.T. Chen, and S.C. Hu. 1999. “Implications of Technology and 
Education for Wage Dispersion: Evidence from Taiwan.” In Ranis, Hu and Chu, eds. 
Essays in Memory of John CH Fei: The political economy of Taiwan's development 
into the 21st century. 
 
Chen, B. L., and M. Hsu, M. 2001. “Time‐Series Wage Differential in Taiwan: The 
Role of International Trade.” Review of Development Economics 5(2): 336-354. 
 
Cheng, P. C. 2004. “Educational Expansion and Wage Inequality: A Cohort Analysis 
of Full-Time Male Employees in Taiwan.” Taiwan Economic Review, 32(2):  
233-266. 
22 
 
 
Chotikapanich, Duangkamon, D. S. Rao, and Kam Ki Tang.2007. "Estimating income 
inequality in China using grouped data and the generalized beta distribution." Review 
of Income and Wealth 53(1): 127-147. 
 
Daly, M. C., and R.G. Valletta. 2006. “Inequality and poverty in United States: the 
effects of rising dispersion of men's earnings and changing family behaviour.” 
Economica, 73(289): 75-98. 
 
Deltas, George. 2003. “The small-sample bias of the Gini coefficient: results and 
implications for empirical research.” Review of Economics and Statistics 85 (1): 
226-234. 
 
Fernandez, Raquel, and Richard Rogerson. 2001. “Sorting and long-run inequality.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4): 1305-1341. 
 
Fields, Gary S., and Jesse B. Leary.1999. “Economic and demographic aspects of 
Taiwan's rising family income inequality.” In Ranis, Hu and Chu, eds. Essays in 
Memory of John CH Fei: The political economy of Taiwan's development into the 
21st century. 
 
Fields, Gary S., and Gyeongjoon Yoo. 2000. "Falling labor income inequality in 
Korea's economic growth: patterns and underlying causes." Review of Income and 
Wealth 46 (2): 139-159. 
 
Fournier, Martin. 2001. “Inequality decomposition by factor component: a 
“rank-correlation” approach illustrated on the Taiwanese case.” Recherches 
économiques de Louvain, 67(4): 381-403. 
 
Gihlab, Rania and Kevin Lang. 2016 “Education homogamy and assortative mating 
has not increased.” IZA working paper No. 10413. 
 
Goldin, Claudia. D., and Lawrence F. Katz. 2009. The race between education and 
technology. Harvard University Press. 
 
Greenwood, Jeremy, Nezih Guner, Georgi Kocharkov, and Cezar Santos. 2014. 
"Marry your like: Assortative mating and income inequality." The American 
Economic Review 104 (5): 348-353.  
23 
 
 
Heywood, John S., And Daniel Parent. 2012. “Performance pay and the white-black 
wage gap.” Journal of Labor Economics, 30(2): 249-290. 
 
Karoly, L. A., and G. Burtless. 1995. “Demographic change, rising earnings inequality, 
and the distribution of personal well-being, 1959–1989.” Demography, 32(3), 
379-405, 1995. 
 
Katz, Lawrence F., and Kevin M. Murphy. 1992. “Changes in relative wages, 1963–
1987: supply and demand factors.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1): 
35-78. 
 
Keng, Shao-Hsun, Chun-Hung Lin, and Peter Orazem (forthcoming) “Expanding 
college access in Taiwan, 1978 – 2014: Effects on graduate quality and income 
inequality.” Journal of Human Capital. 
 
Kremer, Michael. 1997. “How much does sorting increase inequality?” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 112(1): 115-139. 
 
Lazear, Edward P. 1986. “Salaries and piece rates.” Journal of Business 59(3): 
405-431. 
 
Lazear, Edward P. 2000. “Performance Pay and Productivity.” The American 
Economic Review, 90(5): 1346-1361. 
 
Lemieux, Thomas, W. Bentley MacLeod, and Daniel Parent. 2009. “Performance pay 
and wage inequality.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1): 1-49. 
 
Lin, Chun-Hung A., and Peter F. Orazem. 2004. “A reexamination of the time path of 
wage differentials in Taiwan.” Review of Development Economics, 8(2):  295-308. 
 
Lorenz, Max O. 1905. “Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth.” 
Publications of the American Statistical Association 9(70): 209-219. 
 
Meng, Xin. 2004. “Economic restructuring and income inequality in urban China.” 
Review of Income and Wealth 50(3): 357-379. 
 
24 
 
Milanovic, Branko. 1997. "A simple way to calculate the Gini coefficient, and some 
implications." Economics Letters 56(1): 45-49. 
 
Milanovic, Branko, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2002. "Decomposing world income 
distribution: Does the world have a middle class?" Review of Income and Wealth 
48(2): 155-178. 
 
Mussard, Stéphane, J. Sadefo Kamdem, Françoise Seyte, and Michel Terraza. 2011. 
“Quadratic Pen's Parade and the Computation of the Gini index.” Review of Income 
and Wealth 57(3): 583-587. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2011. Divided We Stand 
Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Paris: OECD. 
  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  2015. In It Together: 
Why Less Inequality Benefits All. Paris: OECD. 
 
Pannenberg, Markus, and Martin Spiess. 2009. “GEE estimation of the covariance 
structure of a bivariate panel data model with an application to wage dynamics and 
the incidence of profit-sharing in West Germany.” ASTA Advances in Statistical 
Analysis, 93(4): 427-447. 
 
Peichl, Andreas, Nico Pestel, and Hilmar Schneider. 2012. “Does size matter? The 
impact of changes in household structure on income distribution in Germany.” Review 
of Income and Wealth, 58(1): 118-141. 
 
Pencavel, John. 2006. “A life cycle perspective on changes in earnings inequality 
among married men and women.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(2), 
232-242, 2006. 
 
Sadefo Kamdem, Jules. 2012. “A nice estimation of Gini index and power Pen's 
parade.” Economic Modelling 29(4):  1299-1304. 
 
Schwartz, Christine R. 2010. "Earnings inequality and the changing association 
between spouses’ earnings." AJS; American Journal of Sociology 115 (5): 1524-1557. 
 
Smith, James. P. 1979. “The distribution of family earnings.” The Journal of Political 
Economy, S163-S192, 1979. 
25 
 
 
Sommerfeld, Katrin. 2013. “Higher and higher? Performance pay and wage inequality 
in Germany.” Applied Economics 45(30): 4236-4247. 
 
Wan, Guanghua, Ming Lu, and Zhao Chen. 2007. "Globalization and regional income 
inequality: empirical evidence from within China." Review of Income and Wealth 
53(1): 35-59.  
26 
 
 
 
 
 
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
G
in
i C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
Year
Figure 1: Gini Coefficients in Taiwan based on Individual and household 
income: 1978 to 2014   
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Figure 2: Positive Assortative Index: 1980-2014
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Figure 3: Gini Coefficients in Taiwan based on household income
by Actual and Random mating: 1978 to 2014   
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 
percentile
Figure 4: Married Female Labor Force Participation Rates by 
Household Income Deciles
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Table 1: Actual Mating and Random Mating in 1980 and 2014 
 Wife 
Husband Less than High School High School Junior College College Plus Row Total 
 Actual Random Actual Random Actual Random Actual Random 
Panel A: 1980 
Less than High School 0.626 0.519 0.016 0.084 0.001 0.024 0.0002 0.016 0.642 
High School 0.132 0.158 0.056 0.025 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.196 
Junior College 0.028 0.056 0.026 0.009 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.069 
College Plus 0.022 0.075 0.032 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.021 0.002 0.093 
Column Total 0.808 0.13 0.038 0.025 1 
Panel B: 2014 
Less than High School 0.236 0.010 0.053 0.100 0.003 0.039 0.003 0.057 0.295 
High School 0.079 0.103 0.18 0.104 0.031 0.041 0.017 0.059 0.307 
Junior College 0.014 0.053 0.064 0.054 0.056 0.021 0.025 0.030 0.159 
College Plus 0.007 0.08 0.042 0.08 0.043 0.031 0.147 0.046 0.239 
Column Total 0.336 0.339 0.133 0.192 1 
Panel C: Comparison of Actual Incidence of Positive Assortative Mating versus Random Mating, 1980 and 2014 
 Actual Random Difference  
1980 Diagonal Total 0.716 0.549 0.167  
2014 Diagonal Total 0.619 0.18 0.438  
29 
 
Table 2: Decomposition of the Taiwan Income Variance: 1978-1989 and 1999-2011 
 Within Between Total 
 
෍ߙ௜ߪ௒೔ଶ
௞
௜ୀଵ
 ෍ߙ௜ሺ തܻ௜ െ ധܻሻଶ
௞
௜ୀଵ
 ߪ௒ଶ 
1980-1990 1033 (74%) 372 (26%) 1,405 (100%) 
1992-2002 3,130 (60%) 2,069 (40%) 5,199 (100%) 
2004-2014 3,214 (57%) 2,451 (43%) 5,665 (100%) 
Change (%)   2,181 (211%)    2,079 (559%)    4,260 (303%)
30 
 
Table 3: Counterfactual Household Income Variance by Periods 
Period ߪ௒ଶ	excluding bonus (A) ߪ௒ଶ including bonus (B) Increase due to bonus (B/A)-1 
Actual Sorting (C) 
1980-1990 1196 1,405 17.4% 
1992-2002 4004 5,199 29.9% 
2004-2014 4014 5,665 41.1% 
Random Sorting (D) 
1980-1990 1052 1215 15.5% 
1992-2002 3408 4276 25.5% 
2004-2014 3330 4458 33.9% 
Increase due to marriage market (C/D)-1 
1980-1990 13.7% 15.6%  
1992-2002 17.5% 21.6%  
2004-2014 20.5% 27.1%  
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Table 4: Decomposition of the Changes in Household Income Variance: 1980-2014 
 Share in ∆ߙ௜ Share in ∆ߪ௒೔ଶ  Share in ∆൫ തܻ௜. െ ധܻ൯ଶ Share in ∆ߪ௒ଶ 
Married Households:     
F worked, H 0.61% 1.42% 1.23% 3.27% 
F worked, C 0.04% 0.11% 0.01% 0.16% 
F worked, both C 0.20% 0.72% 0.33% 1.25% 
M worked, H -3.35% 6.77% 2.85% 6.27% 
M worked, C 0.18% 2.77% 0.74% 3.68% 
M worked, both C 2.01% 6.44% 2.23% 10.68% 
both worked, both H 2.89% 9.76% -0.21% 12.44% 
both worked, one C 3.26% 4.84% 1.67% 9.76% 
both worked, both C 9.67% 9.0% 11.39% 30.06% 
Single Households:     
F worked, H 1.12% 1.48% 4.98% 7.58% 
F worked, C 0.75% 3.04% -0.01% 3.78% 
M worked, H 0.76% 1.89% 5.05% 7.70% 
M worked, C 1.41% 2.04% -0.07% 3.38% 
Total: 19.52% 50.28% 30.19% 100% 
Summary:     
Single households 4.023% 8.46% 9.95% 22.44% 
Married households 15.50% 41.82% 20.234% 77.56% 
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Table 4 continued 
Single earner -0.32 18.23% 7.39% 25.30% 
Two earners 15.81% 23.59% 12.85% 52.25% 
Two cplus earners 9.67% 9.0% 11.39% 30.06% 
Two high school earners 2.89% 9.76% -0.21% 12.44% 
At least one college earner 15.35% 23.88% 16.36% 55.59% 
At least one high school earner 3.41% 22.78% 5.534% 31.723% 
